Ne pas croire P et ne pas croire non-P
Posté : 08 mars17, 11:56
Un développement d' un élément important de ce post:
http://www.forum-religion.org/atheisme/ ... 55234.html
Sur ne pas croire P et ne pas croire non P = agnosticisme
Quelques textes :
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/friedman/SJPS.pdf
Let’s call the state that S is in when he has no p-belief and no ¬p-belief, a
state of non-belief with respect to p (or a state of p-non-belief). We can call the
particular kind of non-attitude account of agnosticism suggested by Chisholm
(and others), a “non-belief account”.3 In this paper I want to show that we
cannot capture suspended judgment about p via non-belief with respect to p,
and that we must adopt an attitude account of suspended judgment. As we
try to refine a non-belief account of suspended judgment by adding additional
necessary conditions it will begin to emerge that what we need in our account
is an attitude. What kind of attitude? We can think of the situation this way.
When S is agnostic about p he is effectively neutral or undecided on the matter
of which of p or ¬p is true.4
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254481?se ... b_contents : since my believing that not-P entails my not-believing
that P, but not vice versa. Bien sur ne pas croire P n’implique pas croire non p, mais croire non p implique ne pas croire p. On a la distinction entre athéisme faible et fort au niveau de la croyance.
Différence entre not to believe et believing not (en 6 on a l’agnosticisme de croyance, ne savoir que croire):
Brenton Welford
Written Dec 4, 2015
Writing the question out formally might help to come to a simple definite answer on either side.
Let's put the baggage-laden term belief to the side and focus on another term, assent. To assent to a statement is to affirm the truth of that statement.
Take a given statement and name it P.
Take a given speaker and name her S.
Assume that S is rational.
Negation or "It is not the case that" is represented by the symbol "~".
Here are some relations of assenting which can happen between the speaker and the statement:
(1) S assents to P
(2) S assents to ~P
Also:
(3) ~(S assents to P)
(4) ~(S assents to ~P)
The question asks if (3) and (2) are equivalent. We might also ask if (1) and (4) are equivalent.
I suspect that to hold that these are equivalent you might also have to hold an extra premise. Perhaps the premise that either (1) or (2) must obtain. Call this (5):
(5) For any statement P, S either assents to P or assents to ~P
I find this implausible. It's alot to expect of a speaker. It is also inconsistent with the possibility that both (3) and (4) can sometimes obtain. Call this (6):
(6) For some statement P,
~(S assents to P) & ~(S assents to ~P)
I think (6) is very plausible especially in cases where the speaker simply doesn't know the truth of P.
Suppose P states that on October 1, 2001, Bill Clinton drank 3 pints of beer. I think S can remain rational while neither assenting to P nor assenting to ~P.
That is I think S can rationally withhold assent.
https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/com ... eving_not/
peu de nouveau mais remache un peu. Ce qui me semble determinant, au-delà de la sémantique: si ne pas croire est athée il y aura nécessairement 2 athéismes, et s'il y a 2 athéismes il y aura 2 théismes. Ce point semble décisif et inévitable.
Sur l’agnosticisme
On peut en rester aux variables, je crois que le chien est blanc, Dieu existe, les SS sont immoraux, est indifférent
Ne croire ni p ni non p,
c'est ne savoir que croire sur ca, c'est donc agnostique ou suspension de jugement.
Il y a donc 2 suspensions:
-ne savoir ni p ni non-p
-ne croire ni p ni non-p
La croyance suspendue est donc un agnosticisme.
Il y a effectivement plusieurs sens à l'agnosticisme. La plupart du temps ca concerne le savoir tout court, mais pas seulement:
Webster:
1. 1: a person who holds the view that any ultimate reality (as God) is unknown and probably unknowable; broadly : one who is not committed to believing in either the existence or the nonexistence of God or a god
2. 2: a person who is unwilling to commit to an opinion about something <political agnostics>
On a très souvent suspension of belief (croyance) lié a agnosticism.
Explicitement (comme vu ci-haut):
When S is agnostic about p he is effectively neutral or undecided on the matter
of which of p or ¬p is true.
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/friedman/SJPS.pdf
Or non seulement une attitude propositionnelle de savoir peut être neutre ou indécidée, mais s aussi une attitude propositionnelle de croyance en p ou non-p.
Un autre texte:
Agnosticism is the belief that the nature and existence of gods is unknown and inherently unknowable due to the nature of subjective experience. Technically, this position is strong agnosticism: in popular usage, an agnostic may just be someone who takes no position, pro or con, on the existence of gods, or who has not yet been able to decide, or who suspends judgmentdue to lack of evidence one way or the other (weak agnosticism).
To
Mild Agnosticism:
This is the view (also called weak agnosticism, soft agnosticism, open agnosticism, empirical agnosticism, or temporal agnosticism) that the existence or non-existence of God or gods is currently unknown but is not necessarily unknowable, therefore one will withhold judgment until more evidence becomes available.
Il y a une petite différence entre les 2 paragraphes: dans le second on dit on ne sait pas pour l'instant (unknown) . Dans le 1er la croyance est incluse (no position, decide); croire est une position et on suspend, on ne sait que croire, non seulement on ne sait pas mais on ne croit pas non plus et on est agnostique à cause de ca.
Agnosticisme 1: on peut pas savoir p ou non-p
Agnosticisme 2: je peux pas savoir, ou on peut pas savoir pour l`'instant
Agnosticisme 3: je crois pas p et je crois pas non-p
Je serais pas surpris qu'il y en ait d'autres...
http://www.forum-religion.org/atheisme/ ... 55234.html
Sur ne pas croire P et ne pas croire non P = agnosticisme
Quelques textes :
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/friedman/SJPS.pdf
Let’s call the state that S is in when he has no p-belief and no ¬p-belief, a
state of non-belief with respect to p (or a state of p-non-belief). We can call the
particular kind of non-attitude account of agnosticism suggested by Chisholm
(and others), a “non-belief account”.3 In this paper I want to show that we
cannot capture suspended judgment about p via non-belief with respect to p,
and that we must adopt an attitude account of suspended judgment. As we
try to refine a non-belief account of suspended judgment by adding additional
necessary conditions it will begin to emerge that what we need in our account
is an attitude. What kind of attitude? We can think of the situation this way.
When S is agnostic about p he is effectively neutral or undecided on the matter
of which of p or ¬p is true.4
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254481?se ... b_contents : since my believing that not-P entails my not-believing
that P, but not vice versa. Bien sur ne pas croire P n’implique pas croire non p, mais croire non p implique ne pas croire p. On a la distinction entre athéisme faible et fort au niveau de la croyance.
Différence entre not to believe et believing not (en 6 on a l’agnosticisme de croyance, ne savoir que croire):
Brenton Welford
Written Dec 4, 2015
Writing the question out formally might help to come to a simple definite answer on either side.
Let's put the baggage-laden term belief to the side and focus on another term, assent. To assent to a statement is to affirm the truth of that statement.
Take a given statement and name it P.
Take a given speaker and name her S.
Assume that S is rational.
Negation or "It is not the case that" is represented by the symbol "~".
Here are some relations of assenting which can happen between the speaker and the statement:
(1) S assents to P
(2) S assents to ~P
Also:
(3) ~(S assents to P)
(4) ~(S assents to ~P)
The question asks if (3) and (2) are equivalent. We might also ask if (1) and (4) are equivalent.
I suspect that to hold that these are equivalent you might also have to hold an extra premise. Perhaps the premise that either (1) or (2) must obtain. Call this (5):
(5) For any statement P, S either assents to P or assents to ~P
I find this implausible. It's alot to expect of a speaker. It is also inconsistent with the possibility that both (3) and (4) can sometimes obtain. Call this (6):
(6) For some statement P,
~(S assents to P) & ~(S assents to ~P)
I think (6) is very plausible especially in cases where the speaker simply doesn't know the truth of P.
Suppose P states that on October 1, 2001, Bill Clinton drank 3 pints of beer. I think S can remain rational while neither assenting to P nor assenting to ~P.
That is I think S can rationally withhold assent.
https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/com ... eving_not/
peu de nouveau mais remache un peu. Ce qui me semble determinant, au-delà de la sémantique: si ne pas croire est athée il y aura nécessairement 2 athéismes, et s'il y a 2 athéismes il y aura 2 théismes. Ce point semble décisif et inévitable.
Sur l’agnosticisme
On peut en rester aux variables, je crois que le chien est blanc, Dieu existe, les SS sont immoraux, est indifférent
Ne croire ni p ni non p,
c'est ne savoir que croire sur ca, c'est donc agnostique ou suspension de jugement.
Il y a donc 2 suspensions:
-ne savoir ni p ni non-p
-ne croire ni p ni non-p
La croyance suspendue est donc un agnosticisme.
Il y a effectivement plusieurs sens à l'agnosticisme. La plupart du temps ca concerne le savoir tout court, mais pas seulement:
Webster:
1. 1: a person who holds the view that any ultimate reality (as God) is unknown and probably unknowable; broadly : one who is not committed to believing in either the existence or the nonexistence of God or a god
2. 2: a person who is unwilling to commit to an opinion about something <political agnostics>
On a très souvent suspension of belief (croyance) lié a agnosticism.
Explicitement (comme vu ci-haut):
When S is agnostic about p he is effectively neutral or undecided on the matter
of which of p or ¬p is true.
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/friedman/SJPS.pdf
Or non seulement une attitude propositionnelle de savoir peut être neutre ou indécidée, mais s aussi une attitude propositionnelle de croyance en p ou non-p.
Un autre texte:
Agnosticism is the belief that the nature and existence of gods is unknown and inherently unknowable due to the nature of subjective experience. Technically, this position is strong agnosticism: in popular usage, an agnostic may just be someone who takes no position, pro or con, on the existence of gods, or who has not yet been able to decide, or who suspends judgmentdue to lack of evidence one way or the other (weak agnosticism).
To
Mild Agnosticism:
This is the view (also called weak agnosticism, soft agnosticism, open agnosticism, empirical agnosticism, or temporal agnosticism) that the existence or non-existence of God or gods is currently unknown but is not necessarily unknowable, therefore one will withhold judgment until more evidence becomes available.
Il y a une petite différence entre les 2 paragraphes: dans le second on dit on ne sait pas pour l'instant (unknown) . Dans le 1er la croyance est incluse (no position, decide); croire est une position et on suspend, on ne sait que croire, non seulement on ne sait pas mais on ne croit pas non plus et on est agnostique à cause de ca.
Agnosticisme 1: on peut pas savoir p ou non-p
Agnosticisme 2: je peux pas savoir, ou on peut pas savoir pour l`'instant
Agnosticisme 3: je crois pas p et je crois pas non-p
Je serais pas surpris qu'il y en ait d'autres...